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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS-VENUE FOR PLENARY ACTIONS
UNDER SECTION 70(e)-Plaintiff trustee in bankruptcy brought a plenary
action under section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act1 in the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois for recovery of fraudulently
transferred property located within the district. The defendants were citizens of Illinois, except the bankrupt's daughter, a California citizen. The
district court granted the daughter's motion to dismiss for lack of venue.
On appeal, held, reversed and remanded. Sections 23(b) 2 and 70(e)(3)3 of
the Bankruptcy Act exclude actions under section 70(e) from the requirements of the general venue provision of Title 28, U.S.C.; 4 in all cases under
section 70(e) except those for monies only, venue is governed by the location of the real or personal property in dispute. Yorke v. Frank, 295 F.2d
580 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962).
Congress has implemented the broad constitutional grant of bankruptcy
power5 by designating all United States district courts as courts of bankruptcy6 and by giving them jurisdiction, inter alia, to "determine controversies in relation" to bankruptcy.7 However, district court jurisdiction
of plenary actions 8 between the trustee or receiver and adverse claimants
is generally limited to those cases where jurisdiction would have existed if
the controversy had been between the bankrupt and the adverse claimants
and bankruptcy had not intervened.9 Congress, in formulating section 23(b)
1 This section empowers the trustee in bankruptcy to recover for the estate property
transferred by the bankrupt where such transfer would be voidable by a creditor of the
bankrupt under any applicable federal or state law. 52 Stat. 882 (1938), as amended,
11 U.S.C. § ll0(e) (1958); see 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1f 70.90 (14th ed. 1962).
2 "Suits by the receiver and the trustee shall be brought or prosecuted only in the
courts where the bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings under
this title had not been instituted, unless by consent of the defendant, except as provided
in sections 60, 67, and 70 of this Act." 52 Stat. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1958).
3 "For the purpose of such recovery or of the avoidance of such transfer or obligation, where plenary proceedings are necessary, any State court which would have had
jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened and any court of bankruptcy shall have
concurrent jurisdiction." 52 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § IIO(e)3 (1958).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1958). This section provides that in actions founded only on
diversity venue may be laid in a district where either all plaintiffs or all defendants
reside, "except as otherwise provided by law." Where jurisdiction is not founded solely
on diversity, the suit may be brought only in the district where all defendants reside,
"except as otherwise provided by law."
Ii U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
6 Bankruptcy Act § 1(10), 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 1(10) (1958).
7 Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)7, 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § ll(a)7 (1958).
s A summary proceeding is a relatively brief, less formal hearing conducted by the
bankruptcy court where the dispute arises respecting property in its possession, the
defendant consents, or the act expressly or implicitly authorizes such a proceeding. A
plenary proceeding-an independent civil action by the trustee-is otherwise necessary.
Central Republic Bank &: Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1932); see 2
COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, ,r 23.02; Seligson &: King, Jurisdiction and Venue in
Bankruptcy, 36 REF. J. 36, 73 (1962).
9 Bankruptcy Act § 23(a), 52 Stat. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1958); Bardes v.
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of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, removed this limitation from suits by the
trustee where consent of the defendant is obtained.10 Initial interpretation
of section 23(b) developed along two lines. Several courts held that the
consent clause necessarily made 23(b) a venue provision.11 Others interpreted consent of the defendant under 23(b) as conferring subject-matter
jurisdiction.12 In 1934, Schumacher v. Beeler13 resolved this conflict by
holding 23(b) to be a jurisdictional provision.14 The principal case, relying
on authority antedating Schumacher,1 5 returns to the discarded venue interpretation of 23(b).
Amendments in 1903 and 1910 further narrowed the applicability of
the jurisdictional limitation in section 23(b) by excluding from its operation actions by the trustee to avoid transfers and liens under sections 60,
67, and 70,16 and by granting jurisdiction of these actions to "any court
of bankruptcy" 17 without the defendant's consent.1 8 This exception, like
23(b) itself, concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, not merely venue; 19 and
Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524 (1900). See also Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642 (1947);
2 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1, 1[ 23.12; 5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 2135 (5th ed. 1953).
Corporate reorganization proceedings under chapter X, however, are excluded from the
jurisdictional limitations of § 23(a). Bankruptcy Act § 102, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§ 502 (1958).
10 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1958); see 2 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 1,
23.14.
11 E.g., Matthew v. Coppin, 32 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1929); Coyle v. Duncan Spangler
Coal Co., 288 Fed. 897 (E.D. Pa. 1923); McEldowney v. Card, 193 Fed. 475 (E.D. ';('enn.
1911).
12 E.g., Flanders v. Coleman, 250 U.S. 223 (1919); Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178
U.S. 524 (1900).
13 293 U.S. 367 (1934).
14 The Schumacher holding has received almost unanimous acceptance. Eisenrod v.
Utley, 211 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1954); Halpert v. Engine Air Serv., Inc., 212 F.2d 860
(2d Cir. 1954), petition for certiorari dismissed on motion of petitioner, 350 U.S. 801 (1955);
In re Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 74 F. Supp. 85 (D. Minn. 1947); Nicholson v. Scott, 50 F. Supp.
209 (E.D. Mich. 1943). But cf. Burnham v. Todd, 139 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1943) (dictum);
Canright v. General Fin. Corp., 33 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Ill. 1940) (dictum).
15 Collett v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545 (1919); Rodgers v. Bankers Commercial Co., 42
F.2d 906 (N.D. Ill 1930); Detroit Trust Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 13 F.2d 942 (E.D.
Mich. 1926).
16 32 Stat. 797 (1903) and 36 Stat. 838 (1910), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1958),
17 "Court of bankruptcy" in the context of these sections means those courts so
designated by Congress (see note 6 supra), and not just the primary bankruptcy court.
E.g., May v. Moss, 194 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1952). One court, however, has construed
"any court of bankruptcy" as limiting federal jurisdiction of the subject matter to the
courts in a district where the state tribunals would have had jurisdiction. Lawrence
v. Lowrie, 133 Fed. 995 (M.D. Pa. 1903).
18 Bankruptcy Act § 60(b), 36 Stat. 842 (1910), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1958)
(voidable preferences); Bankruptcy Act § 67(e), 32 Stat. 800 (1903), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 107(e) (1958) (voidable liens and fraudulent conveyances); Bankruptcy Act
§ 70(e)(3), 36 Stat. 879 (1910), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(3) (1958) (voidable transfers
and obligations). A bill recently proposed in Congress but not acted upon would remove
this jurisdictional grant from §§ 60, 67, and 70 and replace it with a provision enabling
the primary bankruptcy court, after due notice to all parties in interest, to exercise summary jurisdiction of actions under these sections. H.R. 4855, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
10 Wood v. Wilbert's Co., 226 U.S. 384 (1912).
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at least since Schumacher the courts have looked to the provisions of 28
U.S.C. £or rules regarding the venue of such actions.20 The error of the
principal case in denying the applicability of the general venue provision
of 28 U.S.C.21 to an action under section 7O(e) apparently flows from a misintepretation of its principal authority, Collett v. Adams,22 which held the
general venue provision23 inapplicable to an action £or avoidance of a preferential transfer only because the suit was local within section 54 of the
Judicial Code of 1911,2~ and not because section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act
necessarily excludes the operation of the general venue statute. Though
the principal case professes not to reach the question of the application
of 28 U.S.C. section 1655,25 its leading authorities base venue in such actions squarely on the provisions for local actions in the Judicial Code of
1911, including the predecessor of present section 1655.26 By following these
cases the court reaches the same result as if it resorted directly to section
1655.

The need £or uniform application of bankruptcy laws and the practical necessity in bankruptcy proceedings of reaching property and persons
beyond state lines were the principal reasons £or the constitutional delegation of a comprehensive federal bankruptcy power.27 Attempts to limit
federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy, however, have been frequent. Proponents of enlarged state court jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters have argued
that greater efficiency, as well as less disturbance of local debtor-creditor
laws, would result from such a limitation of federal jurisdiction as was
embodied in 23(b).28 Nevertheless, recurring depressions and the development of a truly national economy have made clear the existence of a pervasive national interest in a £air and efficient system of bankruptcy administration.29 Central to such a system and vital to any bankruptcy
20 E.g., Crane v. Tannenbaum, 151 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Rollins v. Repper,
69 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Mich. 1947); Cate v. Stapleton, 43 Cal. App. 2d 492, 111 P.2d 437
(1941); see 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note I, 1f 67.46; 5 REMINGTON, op. cit. supra note 9,
t 2186.
21 See note 4 supra.
22 249 U.S. 545 (1919).
28 As then embodied in § 51 of the Judicial Code of 1911, 36 Stat. 1101.
H !16 Stat. 1102.
25 This provision allows venue regardless of the residence of the parties "in an action
in a district court to enforce any lien upon or claim to, or to remove any incumbrance
or lien or cloud upon the title to, real or personal property within the district ••••"
For an examination of the limitations of § 1655, see 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1!11 4.34-.41
(2d ed. 1961).
26 Collett v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545 (1919); Detroit Trust Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 13
F.2d 942 (E.D. Mich. 1926). The only additional authority cited in the principal case
is questionable precedent because of its confusion of venue with jurisdiction of the
person. Rodgers v. Bankers' Commercial Co., 42 F.2d 906 (N.D. Ill. 1930).
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (Madison); Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy
Clause, I AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 220, 225 (1957); Olmstead, Bankruptcy a Commercial
Regulation, 15 HARv. L. REv. 829, 831 (1902).
28 31 CoNc. REc. 1785 (1898) (remarks of Rep. Henderson); see Williams v. Austrian,
331 U.S. 642, 649 (1946); Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367, 374 (1934).
29 WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 8-11 (1935).
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proceeding is the swift and complete consolidation of all property rightfully a part of the bankrupt's estate. Congressional recognition of the
singular importance of this process led to the amendments of 1903 and
1910, which excluded the trustee's actions to recover property for the estate
from the jurisdictional limitations of 23(b). Congress thereby emphasized
the special national interest which attaches to these important aspects of
bankruptcy litigation.30 This confirms the Schumacher conclusion that Congress intended a broad jurisdictional grant in actions by the trustee to
avoid preferences or recover fraudulent transfers. Like reasoning suggests
that venue in such litigation should receive an equally broad construction. Since these proceedings by their very nature concern the recovery of
property, the courts can best facilitate the consolidation of the bankrupt's
estate by recognizing many such actions as local within 28 U.S.C. section
1655,31 permitting venue where the property is located and allowing the
advantages of substituted, extraterritorial service.32 Often, as in the principal case, much of the property the trustee seeks to recover is located in
one district, while some or all defendants are residents of other districts
or states. The trustee's judicious use of section 1655 in this situation will
permit a single, comprehensive action in the district where the property
is located,33 thus minimizing the number of suits necessary to consolidate
the estate, accelerating the process, and reducing the cost of administration.

Martin B. Dickinson, Jr.

30

The express purpose of the 1903 and 1910 amendments, insofar as they affected

§§ 60, 67, and 70, was to alter the holding in Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524
(1900), which had properly interpreted § 23(b) as denying federal jurisdiction in such

actions unless the defendant consented or other grounds of jurisdiction, e.g., diversity,
were present. Thus Congress acted to insure plenary federal jurisdiction in actions under
§§ 60, 67, and 70. 35 CONG. REc. 6941 (1902) (remarks of Rep. Ray, Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee); see Lawrence v. Lowrie, 133 Fed. 995 (M.D. Pa. 1903).
31 The courts have held actions by the trustee under §§ 60, 67, and 70 to be
within 1655 even where such suits included an alternative demand for the value of the
property. E.g., Collett v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545 (1919); Commonwealth Trust Co. v.
Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 28 F. Supp. 586 (W.D. Pa. 1939); Detroit Trust Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 13 F.2d 942 (E.D. Mich. 1926). Actions by general creditors to recover fraudulent transfers have seldom received such treatment. E.g., Grapette Co. v. Grapette
Bottling Co., 102 F. Supp. 517 (D.P.R. 1952). Contra, Mellen v. Moline Malleable Iron
Works, 131 U.S. 352 (1889). See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 208, 234 (1953); 3 MOORE, op. cit.
supra note 25, ~ 18.11.
32 See Carney v. Commonwealth Oil &: Gas Co., 5 F. Supp. 304 (D. Kan. 1933).
33 Where the action is not within § 1655, however, the trustee must usually resort
to § 1391. See Crane v. Tannenbaum, 151 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N,Y. 1957).

